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Afterword: Elite Principles: The ALI Proposals
and the Politics of Law Reform
Carl E. Schneider

God forbid I should insinuate anything derogatory to that profession which is another
priesthood, administrating the rights of sacred justice. But whilst I revere men in the
functions which belong to them, and would do as much as one man can do to prevent
their exclusion from any, I cannot, to flatter them, give the lie to nature. They are good
and useful in the composition; they must be mischievous if they preponderate so as
virtually to become the whole. Their very excellence in their peculiar functions may
be far from a qualification for others. It cannot escape observation that when men are
too much confined to professional and faculty habits and, as it were, inveterate in the
recurrent employment of that narrow circle, they are rather disabled than qualified for
whatever depends on the knowledge of mankind, on experience in mixed affairs, on
a comprehensive, connected view of the various, complicated, external and internal
interests which go to the formation of that multifarious thing called a state.
Edmund Burke

Reflections on the Revolution in France

I. Of This Time, of That Place
It was the expert who benefited most directly from the new framework of politics. The

more intricate such fields as the law and the sciences became, the greater the need for
men with highly developed skills. The more complex the competition for power, the
more organizational leaders relied on experts to decipher and to prescribe. Above all,
the more elaborate men's aspirations grew, the greater their dependence upon specialists
who could transcribe principles into policy.... Only the professional administrator, the
doctor, the social worker, the architect, the economist, could show the way.
Robert H. Wiebe
The Search for Order

The Reporters of the PRINCIPLES were distinguished legal scholars who produced a
serious and ambitious document. The contributors to the present volume subject the
PRINCIPLES to probing, thoughtful, and illuminating analysis. At the volume's beginning,
Professor Glendon puts the problems of family law in a broader perspective by examining the challenges families today face in living good lives. Now, at the volume's close,
I want to put both the PRINCIPLES and the essays in a broader perspective. I need not
vivisect the PRINCIPLES; that is admirably done by the essayists. Rather, I proffer a tool for
understanding the PRINCIPLES more richly by situating them in their time and place.
489
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"Now and then," Lionel Trilling wrote, "it is possible to observe the moral life in process
of revising itself." 1 So it is today. American ways of thinking about the moral lives of families
have been in turmoil for decades, and our ways of thinking about the legal regulation of
families are correspondingly being disturbed and reconceived. The PRINCIPLES reflect these
processes and are part of them, for law truly is the witness and external deposit of our moral
life. But the PRINCIPLES can also rewardingly be understood as a new instance of an old
tradition-elite law reform. In this Afterword, that is how I will try to understand them.
With some diffidence, I will draw on a quarter century's observation of the discipline
of family law from the vantage of a professor at- I confess it - an elite law school. I began
my career as a specialist in family law and found in it not what I had feared- the laborious
study of a dry and technical system- but what I had sought- the opportunity for a large
survey of causes. 2 However, as the field's center of gravity shifted from scholarship to
advocacy, the narrowed range of opinion and tolerance in it became parching. I found in
the neighboring discipline of law and bioethics a nourishing assortment of professional
backgrounds and outlooks. Nevertheless, I have never ceased writing in family law and
watching it from a safe distance. More largely, my calling has made me a witness to the
process by which the moral life- the ideological, political, cultural life- of elite law schools
is being revised. That too will be part of our story.

II. Introduction
It may be objected that the progressivism espoused by corporation lawyers on a moral holiday would be a rather conservative sort of thing .... [T] his was not out of harmony with
the general tone of the Progressive movement, especially in the Eastern states .... There
Progressivism was a mild and judicious movement, whose goal was .... the formation
of a responsible elite, which was to take charge of the popular impulse toward change
and direct it into moderate and, as they would have said, "constructive" channels - a
leadership occupying, as Brandeis so aptly put it, "a position of independence between
the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either."
Richard Hofstadter
The Age of Reform

Elite law reform has a long and honorable tradition abroad and at home. In England,
Whig aristocrats brought a measure of democracy to politics in the nineteenth century. In
America, upper-middle-class Progressive reformers brought a measure of social welfare to
life in the twentieth century. A late but typical fruit of the latter effort was the American
Law Institute, which was founded "to promote the clarification and simplification of the
law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice,
and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work."
The ALI's incorporators were flamboyantly elite; they included William Howard Taft,
Charles Evans Hughes, and Elihu Root. The ALI remains emphatically elite. It comprises
an elected membership of eminent lawyers, judges, and law professors and an ex officio
membership of the ChiefJustice of the United States, the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, the Chief Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals, the Attorney General and
Solicitor General of the United States, the chief justices of the state supreme courts, law
I LIONEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY I (Harvard U Press, !982).
2 See Carl E. Schneider, Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 J. L. REFORM 1039 (1985).
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school deans, and the presidents of various legal organizations, including the national and
state bar associations. Elite indeed.
The ALI has wielded influence beyond the fantasies of its founders. The Model Penal
Code and the Restatements are as close to binding precedent as nongovernmental authority
can be, and they are only part of the Institute's agenda. The ambition of ALI programs
has expanded impressively over the years. The founders rather modestly thought that
the law's uncertainty and complexity had produced a "general dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice." They rather modestly assumed that those problems could be
ameliorated if experts collaborated to solve essentially technical problems in interpreting
the law. Behold the Restatements. At their heart was an attempt to understand a body of
law in light of the complexities time had produced in it and to rationalize its doctrines
cogently and acutely. This is the kind of work lawyers are trained to do, it is work skillful
lawyers do better than mediocre lawyers, and it raises relatively few concerns about how
elites exercise their powers.
But elites can hardly be so cabined. The ALI has long since ceased to regard itself as
just a source of technical proficiency in the law and has come to value itself as a source of
social policy. How could it not? Even technical analysis of precedents in private law asks
the analyst to make choices that affect social policy. And once you begin to improve the law
by rationalizing it, you notice other sorts of defects in the law, defects you are conveniently
located to repair. When you have disposed of subjects that present "technical" issues, your
search for more labors to perform leads you to subjects that implicate broad issues of public
welfare. So having restated the law of contracts, you find yourself proposing a model penal
code, and you then realize you must decide what the law of abortion should be. And from
thence, where can you not go?
And so the ALI's expertise - whatever that is now thought to be - has been brought
to bear on family law, and the ALI now offers its PRINCIPLES for the edification of the
institutions that govern us. The PRINCIPLES are of their time and place. The time is the
time when the generation whose elite excoriated elitism has become the nation's elite and
enjoys its elite powers even while denying its elite status. The place is the American law
school: The membership of the ALI approves the Institute's products and often modifies
them before approving them, but the bulk of the work is done by the Reporters and, to
a much lesser extent, the committees that advise them. The committee that assisted the
drafters comprised family law scholars, practicing lawyers, and judges.

III. Elites and Masses: Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?
The culture wars that have convulsed America since the sixties are best understood as a
form of class warfare, in which an enlightened elite (as it thinks of itself) seeks not so
much to impose its values on the majority (a majority perceived as incorrigibly racist,
sexist, provincial, and xenophobic), much less to persuade the majority by means of
rational public debate, as to create parallel or "alternative" institutions in which it will
no longer be necessary to confront the unenlightened at all.
Christopher Lasch
The Revolt of the Elites

The overriding challenge for elite law-making is normative and plain. Democracy is
"government of the people, by the people, for the people." Elites have interests of their
own, and their advantages- their education, their wealth, their experience, their economic,
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social, and political power - permit them to drown out their social inferiors when law is
debated. As the examples of the Whig aristocracy and the Progressive reformers suggest,
elite government can mean government for the people. Exactly because elites are elites,
they benefit from the flourishing (at least as they understand the term) of the society they
wish to lead. (That's why Engine Charlie Wilson thought that what's good for the country
is good for General Motors.) Furthermore, when elites let slip the laboring oar, the ship
of state often falters. Nevertheless, there is (as lawyers like to say) a tension between the
democratic ideal of government by the governed and the exercise of elite authority. Even
if elites are benevolent oligarchs, even if their contributions to law-making are essential,
the democratic ideal dreams of a world in which nonelites join in their own government.
Assuring that people of all kinds can participate in making family law is particularly
troublesome because several factors stimulate elite law professors to maximize their own
influence and to minimize the influence of their opponents. On these issues, solicitude for
their social inferiors appeals little to the academic elite. On the contrary, on these issues,
that elite sees itself not as triumphing but as assailed. It must smite the infidels to the
uttermost, since, as Harry Truman put it so clearly, "they are wrong and we are right."
To explain all this, I need to sketch the culture of the elite legal academy. Briefly, its
ideology is the ideology of the contemporary American left, so much so that "radical
academics, firmly entrenched in university life, dismiss conservative critics of themselves
as 'marginal intellectuals."' 3 Allegiance to that ideology is not just the norm; it is deepseated and intensely felt, sometimes to the point of intolerance. Some of the reasons for
this need to be understood. They grow out of the ideological evolution of the academic
left. That left is not what it was. Historically, the predominant characteristic of the left
here and in Europe was a concern for class and for the people at the nether reaches of
the class structure. In the 1950s and early 1960s, when the first tier of the baby boom
generation (from which come most of the actors in our story) was growing up, this meant
allegiance to the working class, unions, and the poor, an allegiance which culminated in
President Johnson's war on poverty. At the same time, of course, the civil rights movement
was aborning. It increasingly became the template for thinking about social problems. At
first, this fit easily into traditional leftist class thinking. Eventually, however, the left came
to think less about class and more about disadvantaged and stigmatized groups. As is well
known, this has in recent years led the left increasingly toward what are loosely called
identity politics.
The shift from class to identity has transformed elite academic thinking about its politics
and its role in making policy. When class was the issue, leftist academics tended to align
themselves with the poor and the workers. Distance from, dislike for, and disdain toward
those classes certainly existed; but it affronted the principal principles of the left and had to
be suppressed. Likewise, distance from, dislike for, and disdain toward the right certainly
existed and was certainly expressed, but while rightists might be mean-hearted, misguided,
and selfish, their opinions were not outside the sphere of decent morality.
Now that identity is the template, the attitude of the left toward their social inferiors
and toward their opponents has changed crucially. The left is no longer united with other
classes and is, if anything, alienated from them. True, the left is committed to the welfare
of"minorities," but from the vantage of the elite law professor, the left's agenda deals most
directly with the welfare of relatively prosperous members of those minorities, especially
3 ALAN WOLFE, MARGINALIZED IN THE MIDDLE

7 (U of Chicago Press, 1996).
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through the program that affects academics most - affirmative action for faculty and
students. Similarly, another prominent part of the academic left's agenda deals with cultural
matters (like multicultural education) which are not specific to the poor members of
minorities.
Not only has the trend from class to identity frayed the ties that bound the leftist elite
with other classes; the trend has also given that left multiplying reasons to condemn the
behavior and beliefs of those classes. A century ago, moderate forms of ethnic prejudice
were regarded even in genteel society as, at worst, a lapse in character not conspicuously more dreadful than others. Today, however, the twentieth -century travail of religious
and racial bigotry has made invidious ethnic distinctions the outward sign of the basest
inward depravity. Bigotry is not just wrong; it is evil. And in recent decades "bigotry"
has expanded in two ways. First, it embraces invidious treatment of a lengthening list of
groups. Second, it encompasses increasingly refined kinds of prejudice: "subtle" racism,
"institutional" racism, and even racial "insensitivity" have been assimilated with more
virulent and vicious forms of racism.
Elite law professors believe the programs they favor are not just wise; they are essential
if bigotry and its consequences are to be purged from American life. If this is so, are not
the left's opponents at least dupes of bigots, if not actually bigots themselves? Many parts
of the academic left's agenda, then, are not just issues of policy; they are moral issues on
which only one opinion can be tolerated. Decent people can only favor affirmative action,
bans on military recruiting, and Roe v. Wade. Once to every man and nation ...
There is a class element in all this. Since elite academics associate the working class and
the lower-middle class with opposition to identity politics, the class gulf between the elite
and the rest is wide and widening. Christopher Lasch, for example, concluded that '"Middle
America' ... has come to symbolize everything that stands in the way of progress: 'family
values,' mindless patriotism, religious fundamentalism, racism, homophobia, retrograde
views of women. " 4 Academics also associate those classes with religious faith, and, as Lasch
writes, "the elites' attitude to religion ranges from indifference to active hostility. It rests
on a caricature of religious fundamentalism as a reactionary movement bent on reversing
all the progressive measures achieved over the last three decades."
Let me give some life to this otherwise abstract description with an example of the first
minutes of a first meeting with an academic from another institution. The Terri Schiavo
case had been preoccupying the news, and I mentioned that illness had doomed me to
grueling hours of Schiavo television. Certain I shared his political opinions, my interlocutor made some scoffing remarks about Republicans in Congress. I said he seemed quite
contemptuous of his fellow citizens. He seemed startled that I could think ofRepublicans as
fellow citizens: "Sometimes contempt is the only response .... " Republicans were not only
stupidly wrong; they were self-serving and hypocritical. Their ideas were best explained in
terms of social pathology, since the ideas were intellectually absurd. Modernity had passed
these Middle Western and middle-class yokels by, and their status anxiety led them to cling
to pathetic religious beliefs and social delusions. 5
4 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES: AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 29 (W.W. Norton, 1995).
5 Plus fa change:" [T]he effect of [Mr. Mencken's] polemic is to destroy, by rendering it ridiculous and unfashionable,
the democratic tradition of the American pioneers. This attack on the divine right of demos is an almost exact
equivalent of the earlier attack on the kings, the nobles, and the priests. He strikes at the sovereign power, which
in America today consists of the evangelical churches in the small communities, the proletarian masses in the
cities, and the organized smaller business men everywhere. The Baptist and Methodist sects, the city mobs, and the
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In sum, the problem of elite authority and democratic participation presents itself with
particular force when family law is formulated. No small part of the elite concludes that in
this area their social inferiors espouse positions that they "loathe and believe to be fraught
with death." And " [i] f you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away
all opposition."6
Elite law-making is perhaps least dangerous when elites have "technical" skills and
expertise to contribute to "technical" analysis of "technical" issues of law. Not only do
elites have special advantages in making policy in these areas, the public is disadvantaged.
The public ordinarily has little idea that those issues exist, much less any idea of what is at
stake in them and how they ought to be handled. Nor is it practical to bring people up to
speed on every item of governmental policy.
Elite law-making is also relatively benign where the elite must work within established
authority, as was the original intention of the Restatements. Even then law reformers will
have room to make policy, but in those areas we may say of elites what Justice Holmes said
of judges: "I recognize without hesitation that judges must and do legislate, but they do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." 7 In these areas,
that is, we need worry less about elites imposing their own perspectives and preferences
on the rest of society and rejoice in their labors for us.
Family law, on the other hand, falls within neither category. The laws that currently
govern the family are not especially technical or complex. They do not regulate arcane
corners of life. Nor were the drafters of the PRINCIPLES confined within constricting
authority; the PRINCIPLES do not even pretend to be a restatement of the earlier law, and
professional incentives and inclinations drew the drafters away from the established and
toward the fresh, the iconoclastic, and the radical. The point can be made even more
emphatically: the PRINCIPLES do not raise questions about legal doctrine as much as they
ask us what kinds of lives in families we want to promote and how social resources should
be used to achieve our goals. As legal issues go, these are topics citizens are well-equipped
to understand because they involve the lives citizens live. And for just that reason these are
issues citizens should be able to decide. If ever democracy is to work, if ever people should
be able to participate widely and truly in shaping policies under which they live, it should
be here.
Perhaps these considerations should have given the ALI pause when it considered writing an elite prescription for family law. These considerations, after all, become yet more
troubling when seen in light of a principal element in the modern law of the family the removal of critical aspects of that law from legislative resolution and their transfer to
courts acting under the authority of the Constitution. Government by the Supreme Court
is elite government in excelsis. It is government by nine unelected shamans with unreviewable authority. Only lawyers may address the Court, and only litigants may hire lawyers
to address the Court. It is elite government with many of its worst respects, not least its
narrowness of experience and perspective, a narrowness that directly interferes with the
Chamber of Commerce are in power. They are the villains of the piece." Walter Lippman, The Saturday Review of
Literature (December 11, 1926).
6 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting) . I analyze these issues at strenuous length
in Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1988).
7 Quoted in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDICIAL PROCESS 69 (Yale U Press, 1975).

Afterword: Elite Principles

495

Court's ability even to anticipate the reactions to their rulings. (I strongly suspect, for
example, that the Court was astonished when Roe v. Wade provoked a passionate response,
astonished because most of the Justices lived in circles in which they rarely had to confront
right-to-life opinions.) 8
The distance between judicial government and democratic government is currently
exacerbated by the recent interest in having the Supreme Court join courts from other
countries in building an international body of human-rights law, no small part of which
would affect our family law. My colleague Christopher McCrudden writes, "It is now
commonplace for courts in one jurisdiction to refer extensively to the decision of other
courts in interpreting human-rights guarantees."9 America is much reviled for its parochial
failure to follow suit. But how is it democratically decent to hand over law-making power
to unelected judges guided not by policy electorally established, not by American law and
tradition, but by what they and their upper-middle-class confreres from abroad think true
at the opening of the twenty-first century?

IV. The View from the Tower, The Wisdom of Crowds
The human understanding is not a dry light, but is infused by desire and emotion,
which give rise to 'wishful science'. For man prefers to believe what he wants to be
true. He therefore rejects difficulties, being impatient of inquiry; sober things, because
they restrict his hope; deeper parts of Nature, because of his superstition; the light of
experience, because ofhis arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to concern itself
with things mean and transitory; things that are strange and contrary to all expectation,
because of common opinion.
Francis Bacon
Novum Organum

Elites will always dominate law-making; this is one corollary of the iron law of oligarchy.
But can we say anything more about the proper sphere of elite activity? This leads us to
the second basic problem with elite law-making- some things it does well, some things it
does badly. I have already mentioned some of the former. What of the latter?
Democracy is not only just because it lets the governed govern; it is wise because it
consults the experience and insights of all parts of society. This elite policymaking can
hardly do even in good circumstances. And these are not good circumstances. Family
law affects almost everyone, but elite law professors generally come from and inhabit an
isolated sliver of society. Too little in their lives dips them in the great streams of American
society; too much in those dips confirms their prejudices about their fellow citizens.
The culture oflaw schools is astoundingly homogeneous. This is true even demographically. Because I was a member of our hiring committee, I recently browsed through the
website biographies of colleagues who joined our faculty in the last couple of decades.
Half of those who had a law degree received it from Yale, a third from Harvard, three
from Columbia, one from Virginia, and one from Cardozo. (The last of these also had a
8 I expatiate generously on the problem of judicial government in State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth-Amendment
"Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 79 ( 1988).
9 J. CHRISTOPHER McCRUDDEN, A Part of the Main? The Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases and Comparative Law
Methodology in the United States Supreme Court, in LAw AT THE END OF LIFE: THE SuPREME CouRT AND AssiSTED
SuiCIDE (Carl E. Schneider ed., U of Michigan Press, 2000).
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Harvard Ph.D.) Roughly half are Jewish; apparently one is Catholic; few are religious (in
the most religious country in the industrialized world). They seem largely to come (like
our students) from the class of which they are now members- the professional uppermiddle class. These fine colleagues and first-rate scholars boast a marvelously wide range
of expertise in disciplines outside law, but otherwise it is hard to imagine a much more
homogeneous group in such a heterogeneous society.10
The field of family law is astonishingly homogeneous as well, although in a different
way. When I joined the field in 1981, both men and women were prominent figures in it.
In the years since then, many- although certainly not all- of the men who had been doing
exciting work in the field gradually left it. I can think of only three men who have achieved
prominence who entered the field since then, and not all of them have stayed.
Similar in origin, elite law professors are similar in thought. The range of political views
among them is so straitened that the greater part of American political opinion is virtually
excluded. On many social issues opinion is so standard that, in my long and consistent
experience, professors automatically assume you agree with them and will enjoy sharing
their contempt for the knaves who disagree with us.
How might it matter that the most crucial work of producing the PRINCIPLES was
performed by such cultural isolates? No single fact about the PRINCIPLES should have
been more salient, more arresting, more daunting, more chastening to the Institute and its
agents than this: The history of family law reform is the history of savaged hopes. Those
reforms have regularly failed to achieve the ends for which they were proposed. They have
regularly produced results that were unanticipated and unwanted. What made the ALI
think their reforms would fare better? What did they do to understand the reasons for the
record of failure? What did they do to avoid the traps into which their predecessors had
fallen? What could they have done?
The ALI should have been alerted to this problem by, if nothing else, the fact that the
law in general chronically fails, conspicuously and crucially fails. Its record of thwarted
plans encompasses many areas of law and many techniques of regulation. For example,
most of the central legal features of the law of bioethics have fallen strikingly short of the
expectations that justified their adoption. 11 A favorite legal technique - requiring the
stronger party in a transaction to provide the weaker party with information (as in
the law of informed consent) rarely seems to affect behavior significantly, much less give
the weaker party the authority the advocates of this technique fondly imagine. 12 Family law
reforms, however, have particularly severe enforcement problems. They are of two general

On the day this Afterword was due, my attention was drawn to a symposium in the first number of Volume 23
of the Yale Law and Policy Review which discusses the homogeneity of elite law school faculties. The pieces in the
symposium appear to confirm quite impressively the experience I describe above.
11 On the failure of the law of bioethics to achieve its purposes, see, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The Best-Laid Plans,
30 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 24 (July/August 2000); Carl E. Schneider, Gang Aft Agley, 31 HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 27 (January/February 2001). On the miserable failure of one of that law's showpieces, see Angela Fagerlin
& Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 30 (March/April2004).
12 Take Miranda warnings: They '"have little or no effect on a suspect's propensity to talk'. Next to the warning
label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official advice in our society.. . . Not only
has Miranda largely failed to achieve its stated and implicit goals, but police have transformed Miranda into a
tool of law enforcement . . .. " Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance ofMiranda in the Twenty-First Century,
99 MICH. L. REv. 1000 (2001). Similar gloom surrounds studies of informed consent, product-liability warnings,
health-insurance report cards, financial-privacy disclosures, and many other areas in which disclosures are legally
mandated.
10
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kinds - first, a failure of legal institutions to respond as reformers anticipate; second, a
failure oflegal rules and institutions to affect people's behavior in the ways intended.
Can things really be this bad? Let me lend verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and
unconvincing narrative with several examples. Changing lives by changing judicial behavior
should be the easy kind of reform. Judges are trained and obliged to take instruction. Law
reformers imagine themselves like the centurion: "I say to this man, Go, and he goeth;
and to another, Come, and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it." In
fact, they are more like Harry Truman's prophecy of Dwight Eisenhower, "He'll sit here,
and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike - it won't be a bit like
the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." Consider two examples of legal reform through
judicial instruction.
Exhibit A: One of the worthiest goals of family law is to improve the lives of the children of
divorce, not least by rescuing them from the penury in which they often languish. One of
the most active subjects for family law reform has been that enterprise. One of the areas
of widest agreement has been that the core reform should be substituting guidelines for
judicial discretion. Yet "[w]hile Congress adopted the numerical guidelines requirement
with the aim of significantly increasing award levels and decreasing award variability,
available evidence suggests that these goals have not been met. Awards calculated under
existing guidelines do not appear to differ dramatically from those produced under earlier
discretionary standards." 13
Exhibit B: Few areas of family law have been of more interest in the current era than the
rules governing the division of marital wealth. In few areas has there been as much change
in legal doctrine. To what end?
California replaced its equitable property distribution regime with a rule requiring equal
division of marital property on the assumption that equitable distribution typically
produced relatively equal awards for husband and wife. The change was expected to curb
case variation without altering overall outcomes. But researchers later determined that
wives had typically received more than half of the marital property under the old law,
and they also discovered that deferred distribution of the marital home in cases involving
minor children declined dramatically under the new one. 14

The enforcement problems of family law extend beyond the recalcitrance of judges. Many
reforms have gone awry because the people regulated have not reacted to the law's incentives
as intended. For example, Michael Wald's study oflegal responses to parents who abuse or
neglect their children raises the possibility that those responses matter less than anyone had
supposed. He concluded that, considering only "what happened to the children from the
time we first saw them until the end of the study, two years later, there was not a great deal of
difference between home and foster care." 15 For another example, the contributors to In the
Interest of Children reported that people avail themselves of the due-process mechanisms
so beloved of the law far less than courts and scholars fondly contemplate. 16
Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community?: An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REv.
41,44 (1998).
14 Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve Current
Outcomes?, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL. 119, 122 (2001) .
15 MICHAEL 5. WALD, J. M. CARLSMITH, & P. H. LEIDERMAN, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 183
(Stanford U Press, 1988).
16 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(W. H. Freeman, 1985).
13
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Nothing will assure that the law works properly. Making law is as supremely challenging
as any human enterprise. James Scott correctly says that even a
prudent, small step, based on prior experience, yields new and not completely predictable
effects that become the point of departure for the next step. Virtually any complex task
involving many variables whose values and interactions cannot be accurately forecast
belongs to this genre: building a house, repairing a car, perfecting a new jet engine,
surgically repairing a knee, or farming a plot of land. Where the interactions involve
not just the material environment but social interaction as well - building and peopling new villages or cities, organizing a revolutionary seizure of power, or collectivizing
agriculture - the mind boggles at the multitude of interactions and uncertainties (as
distinct from calculable risks)Y

How are law-makers to survey that "multitude of interactions and uncertainties"?
Empirical study of the way people encounter the law, surely. Unhappily, few law professors relish that work. Theory and doctrine, not empirical research, are their metier. 18
This is tantalizing, because, as the research I just reviewed shows, laws repeatedly perform
in counterintuitive ways.
In the absence of adequate empirical research, what is a law-maker to do? Iflaw depends
on the ways many kinds of people respond to many kinds of incentives and sanctions,
sensible law-makers draw on the insights of many kinds of people about many kinds of
experience. Here elite law-making falls short almost by definition, for it tends to consult
just the insights of a few kinds of people with a few kinds of experience. Which is only
to say that the straightened experience and perspective of elite law professors is a sadly
deficient basis for making policy that affects everyone.
There is another respect in which family law needs the participation of all manner of
people: If the PRINCIPLES are actually to shape people's behavior, people must understand,
respect, and accept them. This need for public collaboration is more generally true of the
law than law propounders think. As one eminent elitist knew:
The amount oflaw is relatively small which a modern legislature can successfully impose.
The reason for this is that unless the enforcement of the law is taken in hand by the
citizenry, the officials as such are quite helpless .... [I]nsofar as a law depends upon
the initiative of officials in detecting violations and in prosecuting, that law will almost
certainly be difficult to enforce .... For what gives law reality is not that it is commanded
by the sovereign but that it brings the organized force of the state to the aid of those
citizens who believe in the law. 19

So what chance would the PRINCIPLES have of attaining the collaboration of the people
regulated by it? The first, and simplest, condition for the PRINCIPLEs' success is that people
will know what the PRINCIPLES say. However, few people know anything reliable about
the law of the family when they marry. Nor do they care to learn, since they lovably assume
that the law will never apply to them.
17 }AMES

C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO lMPRQVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED
327 (Yale U Press, 1998).
18 See Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life's Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship and American Law, forthcoming
in 2006 Utah Law Review, which explicitly and relentlessly explores the extent of and need for empirical research
in family law.
19 WALTER LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO MORALS 276-77 (Macmillan, 1929).
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This is actually a pervasive problem in the law. A sobering literature "reveals that, to
the lawyer's chagrin, businesses resist using contracts, ranchers do not know what rules of
liability govern damage done by wandering cattle, suburbanites do not summon the law to
resolve neighborhood disputes, engaged couples do not know the law governing how they
will own property when they marry, citizens repeatedly reject the due process protections
proffered them, and, what is worse, all these people simply don't care what the law says." 20
Popular knowledge about, comprehension of, and acquiescence in family law is especially
problematic. People have their own moral and social norms of family behavior, norms that
are often deeply considered and warmly embraced. Since people have adequate precepts
of their own, why study the law's? Furthermore, people assume that they know what the
law is. They have heard stories. Besides, people commonly suppose that their values are
widely shared and thus expect that the law enacts what they believe. All this means that
people will not inquire into what the law is and instead will rely on mistaken assumptions
about it, if they think about it at all.
On divorce, things are hardly better. At this point, people must come to grips with
legal institutions. This does not, however, mean that people will then learn the law or
that the law will be applied as its drafters intended. Studies suggest that when divorcing
couples meet their lawyers, they are eager to persuade their lawyers to see the case as
they see it- in terms of the couple's moral relations (as the client sees them). Lawyers
struggle to persuade their clients to abandon that preoccupation and to accept the
law's terms, terms the clients often find misconceived and perverse. Few lawyers find
it rewarding to teach the client the law, and they often settle for inducing the client to be
practical. 21
The understanding and acquiescence of clients in the PRINCIPLES might not be so
necessary if clients litigated and judges decided divorce cases. In fact, most divorce cases
are settled after negotiations, so that what judges do is much more marginal than reform
proposals ordinarily assume. It was once thought that these negotiations were conducted
"in the shadow of the law," but this supposition has lost ground. For example, Robert
Mnookin, one of the early proponents of this theory, discovered in his empirical work that
his speculations about it were not confirmed. 22 One reason for this is that most families
cannot afford to pay lawyers and consequently must do the negotiating themselves in
relative ignorance of (and indifference to) what the law says.
I have been discussing a number of reasons people will not understand, accept, apply,
and live with the ALI proposals. Suppose, absurdly, that a citizen truly wanted to do all
those things. How accessible would the PRINCIPLES be to even the most earnest person?
Suppose someone actually tried to study the PRINCIPLES. What then? First, levels ofliteracy
being what they are, few Americans could read them. (Eighty percent of the country cannot
understand a written definition for jurors of"peremptory challenge.")
Second, even were literacy no problem, our earnest citizen would be wholly befuddled
by the PRINCIPLEs' complexity and obscurity. I know, because I assigned my (elite) firstyear students the marital property section of the PRINCIPLES and then included in the
final exam a copy of that section and a simple hypothetical in which the PRINCIPLES were
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2 CARL E. SCHNEIDER, BIOETHICS IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW, 24 Hastings Center Report 16 {Jul/Aug 1994).
21 See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN
THE LEGAL PROCESS (Oxford U Press, 1995).
22 ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF CUSTODY
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the sole authority. Disaster. There were few decent answers. Some students were deceived
by language that looked dispositive but was not; some stopped reading too early; many
were just confused by the proliferating mass of rules. I need hardly say the obvious: if law
students are baffled, how will the hapless untrained citizen fare?
But suppose our earnest citizen is so virtuous as to consult a lawyer about the meaning of
the PRINCIPLES. ''Am I living in a domestic partnership, with all the ominous consequences
that seems to have?," our friend reasonably asks. No lawyer could say. Take just one simplified
example. Domestic partners are "two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married
to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life
together as a couple." There is a presumption that unrelated people who have "maintained
a common household" long enough are a domestic partnership. That presumption is
rebuttable "by evidence that the parties did not share life together as a couple." We are
then told, "Whether persons share a life together as a couple is determined by reference to
all the circumstances, including .... "Here follows a list of thirteen factors to be considered.
Not one of those factors is defined with enough specificity to give it reliable meaning. Nor
is there any way of telling how to weigh the factors against each other. This analysis is only
part of one provision of a wickedly complex document shot through with indeterminate
phrases like "just" and "equitable" and "improper."
A third reason citizens will not easily comprehend the PRINCIPLES is that they are too
distant from the population's ideas about how people should behave in families and how
the law should regulate them. In order to understand a body oflaw, you need to understand
the ideas that animate it. Even if the PRINCIPLES are animated by an orderly set of ideas
(which I have searched for in vain), they will generally seem so counterintuitive that making
sense of them will be insuperably difficult.

V. To Bind and Loose23
[A]lthough it may be that no convention is any longer coercive, conventions remain,
are adopted, revised, and debated. They embody the considered results of experience ....
[T]hey are as necessary to a society which recognizes no authority as to one which does.
For the inexperienced must be offered some kind of hypothesis when they are confronted
with the necessity of making choices: they cannot be so utterly open-minded that they
stand inert until something collides with them. In the modern world, therefore, the
function of conventions is to declare the meaning of experience. A good convention is
one which will most probably show the inexperienced the way to happy experience.
Walter Lippman
A Preface to Morals

Historically, elites have striven to impose order and discipline on their society generally and
their social inferiors particularly. Even when elites have imagined they were motivated by
altruism, historians have insisted that they really wanted social control. 24 Today, however,
23 "[A] culture survives principally . .. by the power of its institutions to bind and loose men in the conduct of their
affairs with reasons which sink so deep into the self that they become cqmmon and implicitly understood .. . . "
PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD 2 (Harper & Row, 1966) .
24 E.g.: "To many of those who could not accept the changing America, evangelical Protestantism seemed an excellent
means of keeping the nation under control." Clifford S. Griffin, Religious Benevolence as Social Control, in ANTEBELLUM REFORM 83 (David Brion Davis ed., Harper & Row, 1967).
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a potent element of elite dogma advocates just the opposite- freedom, release from social
constraint, autonomy- in private life and in public policy. 25 That dogma crucially shapes
the PRINCIPLES.
Marriage is a repressive institution. It is, to be sure, much more. Goethe thought it
"the beginning and the pinnacle of all culture." 26 But it is crucially a repressive institution. What do I mean by this statement, so unfashionable, so provoking? To answer this
question, we return to first principles as they have historically been understood. Those
principles talk about the depravity of human nature. Human nature is irredeemably
self-interested, self-indulgent, and sadie. It therefore must be cabined, cribbed, and
confined.
Nowhere are we more vulnerable to human depravity nor more disposed to it than in
family life. In family life, we are beset by emotions and drives we do not understand and
can not acknowledge. In family life, we live with those who mean the most to us and can do
the most for us. In family life, harsh words, blows, betrayal, and desertion hurt most keenly.
In family life, we can injure each other in ways we cannot elsewhere, as through sexual
infidelity. In family life the most vulnerable people- children -live at the mercy of parents
who are themselves made vulnerable by their affection for their children. And in family
life, success demands (and fabulously rewards) a lifetime of labor and love, compassion
and concession.
One goal of human society is to moderate human depravity; to deprive it of occasions
of sin; to channel it from cruelty toward benignity. Society tries to do this directly, through
the criminal law. But "[t]o try to regulate the internal affairs of a family, the relations of
love or friendship, or many other things of the same sort, by law or by the coercion of
public opinion, is like trying to pull an eyelash out of a man's eye with a pair of tongs. They
may put out the eye, but they will never get hold of the eyelash." 27 Because the state cannot
effectively prevent people from harming each other in the privacy of families through direct
prohibitions, indirect means are critical.
Preeminent among these indirect means is the social institution. A social institution is
"a pattern of expected action of individuals or groups enforced by social sanctions .... " 28
Social institutions shape human behavior by rewarding virtue and penalizing vice, by
making virtue natural and vice unthinkable. People need not enter social institutions,
although there may be incentives to do so. Primarily, rather, it is their very presence, the
social currency they have, and the governmental support they receive which combine to
make it seem reasonable and even natural for people to use them. Thus people can be
said to be channeled into them. As Berger and Luckrnann write, "Institutions ... , by the
very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of
conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would
theoretically be possible." 29 Or as James Fitzjames Stephen wonderfully wrote, "The life of
the great mass of men, to a great extent the life of all men, is like a watercourse guided this
25 For an account of this development in law and life, see CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTI CE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (Oxford U Press,
26 JoHANN VON GOETHE, ELECTIVE AFFINITIES (1809).

1998).

27 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 162 (U Chicago Press,
28 RoBERT N . BELLAH, ET AL., THE GooD SociETY 10 (Alfred A . Knopf, 1991).
29 PETER

L.

1991).
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way or that by a system of dams, sluices, weirs, and embankments .... [I]t is by these works,
that is to say, by their various customs and institutions- that men's lives are regulated." 30
Social institutions, then, are a kind of soft regulation. They are not compulsory. They
work more by inducement than by punishment. They spare people the burden of reinventing the forms of social life by offering them patterns ofbehavior, and they help people
organize and coordinate their relations with family, friends, neighbors, colleagues, and
strangers. 31 In the absence of social institutions, "a successful marriage depends wholly
upon the capacity of the man and the woman to make it successful. They have to accomplish wholly by understanding and sympathy and disinterestedness of purpose what was
once in a very large measure achieved by habit, necessity, and the absence of any practicable alternative." 32 Crucially, the patterns of behavior propounded in social institutions
embody a set of norms, of moral understandings about how people should treat each other.
People are channeled into accepting these norms because their institutions are so ordinary
a part of social customs. Thus are people socialized.
The preeminent institutions of family life are marriage and parenthood. They inhibit
us from abandoning each other, from betraying each other, from destroying our children's
home. In marriage and parenthood, people give hostages to destiny. In marriage and
parenthood, people cede freedom. Marriage and parenthood proffer a fount of blessings,
their yoke can be easy and their burden light; but in marriage begins responsibility, and
responsibility chains liberty. Andrew Sullivan writes, "Marriage provides an anchor, if an
arbitrary and often weak one, in the maelstrom of sex and relationships to which we are all
prone. It provides a mechanism for emotional stability and economic security. We rig the
law in its favor not because we disparage all forms of relationship other than the nuclear
family, but because we recognize that not to promote marriage would be to ask too much
of human virtue." 33
Today, however, marriage and parenthood are losing their power to bind. Law cannot
by itself create or define social institutions; they arise out of and are sustained by social
attitudes and practices. Law can only operate at the margin (for example, through divorce
laws) to affirm, to assist, to adjust institutions. For some years, marriage and parenthood
as social institutions have been weakened by a prolonged historical movement toward
a new conception of moral duties and social institutions, a movement which has been
particularly favored in the elite upper-middle class.
At the heart of this historical movement have been long-advancing trends in the moral
life of America and indeed of the industrialized west. They begin in proud and venerable
elements of the American ethos. That ethos is famously individualistic, and that individualism is remarkable for the special homage it has paid to self-reliance. Tocqueville believed
American democracy reared men "intoxicated with their new power. They entertain a
30 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 63-4 (1967).
31 "[I]n the absence of models that define what is expected of them, Americans will increasingly have to define for
themselves the rules by which they will structure their lives. What this means concretely is that things once taken for
granted will increasingly be subject to complex and difficult negotiations." ALAN WOLFE, AMERICA AT CENTURY's
END 468 (U California Press, 1991 ). Even more broadly, communities are built not just by "a spirit of benevolence,
or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain 'shared final ends' alone, but a common vocabulary of
discourse and a background of implicit practices and understanding within which the opacity of the participants is
reduced if never finally dissolved." MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 172-3 (Cambridge
U Press, 1982).
32 WALTER LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO MoRALS 311 (Macmillan, 1929).
33 ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 182 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).
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presumptuous confidence in their own strength, and as they do not suppose that they
can henceforward ever have occasion to claim the assistance of their fellow creatures, they
do not scruple to show that they care for nobody but themselves." 34 And as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, this strong version of individualism took on
fresh vigor from the gathering power of a vision of the liberated and fulfilled self. That
vision has assumed many forms, but at its core is a therapeutic ethos that has flourished
in a prosperous, consumer society.
The upshot of these developments is an ideal of individual autonomy in which free
choice is central. In this ideal, choice
must be "free" in a strong sense. Choices must be the agents' own, and they must be
based on the agents' critical reflection on their own choices, actions, and conceptions of
a good life. This excludes the substitution of the judgment of some political, religious,
moral, charismatic, or whatever authority for the agents' own. And it excludes as well the
agents' judgments being based on indoctrination, compulsion, unexamined prejudice,
uncontrolled passion, and the like. Autonomy requires that the agents should judge
how they should exercise their freedom and that their judgments should involve the
application of some standards that they have come to accept as a result of critical reflection
on them and on how they should live. 35

In this tradition of what might be called therapeutic individualism, people are admonished
to pursue an independent "search for personal well-being, adjustment, and contentmentin short, for 'health"' 36 - a search that requires people to peel off the false social constraints
that keep them from discovering their own true natures and living their own lives. 37
Associated with therapeutic individualism is a transformation in attitudes toward moral
thought and language. Americans have become, Himmelfarb rightly says, "suspicious of
the very idea of morality. Moral principles, still more moral judgments, are thought to
be at best an intellectual embarrassment, at worst evidence of an illiberal and repressive
disposition". 38 As I wrote recently,
The Americans who today most influence our cultural tone- and particularly the welleducated young Americans in whom these attitudes are most readily perceived- find they
do not even know what is meant by a moral duty (unless perhaps it be a duty to oneself)
34 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 107 (Vintage, 1957).
35 }OHN KEKES, AGAINST LIBERALISM 20 (Cornell U Press, 1997).
36 Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1847

(1985).
The roots of these attitudes run much deeper than my abbreviated summary can suggest. (Brevis esse laboro, obscurus
fio.) For example, James Fitzjames Stephen said in responding to John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: "It is one of the
commonest beliefs of the day that the human race collectively has before it splendid destinies of various kinds,
and that the road to them is to be found in the removal of all restraints on human conduct, in the recognition of
a substantial equality between all human creatures, and in fraternity or general love." ]AMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 52 (U Chicago Press, 1991).
38 GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION oF SociETY: FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MoDERN VALUES
240 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1995). Himmelfarb's illustration of this point is telling:
When members of the president's cabinet were asked whether it is immoral for people to have children out of wedlock,
they drew back from that distasteful word. The Secretary of Health and Human Services replied, "I don't like to put
this in moral terms, but I do believe that having children out of wedlock is just wrong." The Surgeon General was
more forthright: "No. Everyone has different moral standards.... You can't impose your standards on someone else."
Id. at 240-241. These passages are quite typical of what I encounter in my conversations with my students on
this subject. In particular, there is the assumption that if you speak in moral terms you must necessarily intend to
"impose" your "morality" on other people.
37
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and are loath to speak in the outmoded, confining, small-minded, and even dangerous
language of morality. They are moral relativists of a pronounced stripe who consider
their own moral views just as happenstantial and even factitious as other people's. They
see in moral obligation a cloak for the "judgmental." They believe that to visit the breach
of a moral duty with sanctions is to be "punitive." And they detest the punitive. 39

The therapeutic sources of contemporary individualism account for no small part of
the changing attitudes toward moral thinking: "[T] he habit of forbearance, once having
established itself as the first principle of psychiatric therapy, soon became a kind of automatic reflex regulating all forms of interpersonal exchange. A 'nonjudgmental' habit of
mind, easily confused with the liberal virtue of tolerance, came to be regarded as the sine
qua non of sociability. " 40 The traditions ofliberal tolerance and egalitarianism contribute
as well: The upper-middle class men Lamont interviewed "often expressed their belief in
the cultural sovereignty of the individual. They argued that 'the way you choose to dress
and spend your money is your business,' that 'if you feel comfortable with it, that's fine,'
and that it is wrong to be judgmental regarding other people's lifestyles and tastes .... "
They espoused a relativism which led them to "consider all opinions to be equally valuable
and to be grounded in personal preferences ... " 41
Therapeutic individualism and the attitudes toward social constraint and moral duty
which are associated with it erode social institutions. They reflect a sanguine view of
human nature and make the discovery and expression of one's individual authentic nature
the linchpin of life. This understanding attributes evil not to human nature but to the
failure of societies "to foster the autonomy of individuals who live in them. The view of
human nature at the core of the liberal faith is thus that human beings are by their nature
free, equal, rational, and morally good." 42 On these principles, public policy should free
people from any social force that promotes inauthenticity. As Sullivan writes of what he
calls the liberationist view of marriage, "the full end of human fruition is to be free of all
social constructs." 43 This movement sees law as empowering, not socializing; as liberating,
not repressing.
Changes in social practices work in concert with changes in social theory to corrode
marriage as a socializing institution. Divorce proliferates; out-of-wedlock births burgeon;
family forms multiply. "Deinstitutionalization is even celebrated, on the grounds that all
forms of family life should be encouraged and treated equally ... Justice Brennan recently
cited a string of cases he believed indicated that 'we have declined to respect a State's notion,
as manifested in its allocation of privileges and burdens, of what the family should be."' 44
This hardly begins to state the contempt some writers have had for family institutions.
Sullivan writes, "Marriage of all institutions is to liberationists a form of imprisonment; it
Fixing the Family: Legal Acts and Cultural Admonitions, in Alan }. Hawkins, Lynn D. Wardle, & David Orgon
Coolidge, eds., Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-First Century (Praeger, 2002). Lest this seem
harsh, see my attempt to understand morality a Ia mode in Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law:
No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 503.
4 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES: AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 218 (W.W. Norton, 1995).
41 MICHELE LAMONT, MONEY, MORALS, & MANNERS: THE CULTURE OF THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICAN UPPERMIDDLE CLASS 116 (U Chicago Press, 1992).
42 }OHN KEKES, AGAINST LIBERALISM 39 (Cornell U Press, 1997).
43 Sullivan, supra note 33, at 57.
44 Carl E. Schneider, The Law and the Stability ofMarriage: The Family as a Social Institution, in David Popenoe, Jean
Bethke Elshtain, & David Blankenhorn (eds) Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage in America 192
(Rowrnan & Littlefield, 1996) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)(dissent)).
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reeks of a discourse that has bought and sold property, that has denigrated and subjected
women, that has constructed human relationships into a crude and suffocating form." 45
Thus Paula Ettelbrick invokes the wisdom of at -shirt: "Marriage is a great institution ... if
you like living in institutions." 46
Recent decades have also seen the weakening of elements of family law that help make
marriage work as an institution. That institution centrally concerns moral duties people
take on to each other. But family law has increasingly been stripped of occasions for
moral discourse and has increasingly tried to transfer moral decisions from the state to
individualsY For example, in our no-fault age, the court from which you seek divorce
need no longer address the justifiability of the divorce; it lets you decide whether you are
morally entitled to a divorce or, for that matter, to ignore the moral aspects of the divorce
altogether. This is not to say that there is no moral basis for no-fault divorce. There plainly
is. But it is to say that the law's ability to reinforce the moral duties of familial institutions
is inhibited when those duties cannot be discussed.
The PRINCIPLES reflect the elite distrust of social institutions. No small part of the
force of those institutions comes from their distinctiveness. Social institutions offer special
benefits and impose special burdens. People who enter those institutions choose to do so,
they know that they have done so and treat themselves differently because of it, and other
people recognize that they have done so and respond accordingly. One of the most arresting
features of the PRINCIPLES is that they do just the opposite. They blur the distinction
between marriage and cohabitation and between de jure and de facto parenthood.
This blurring is problematic not just because social institutions are sustained by their
distinctiveness; it is also troubling because social institutions are formed by the way people
in them think and act. How would people behave when they became "married" involuntarily, by the operation oflaw? People who choose not to marry may do so because they reject
its social meaning, including the centrality of sexual fidelity. How would their behavior
alter social expectations of marriage?
Furthermore, the broader the scope of marriage, the weaker its principles. And the scope
of marriage could expand in the ordinary way of the slippery slope: Each extension of a rule
makes the next step smaller and easier. This particular slope is waxed by several factors that
have already helped ease our slide down: Much of the argument for broadening the scope of
marriage draws on our contemporary discomfort with distinctions and judgments. Much
of that argument partakes of the wish to accommodate within the term "family" what Kath
Weston calls the "families we choose." Furthermore, as Chambers speculates, "By ceasing
to conceive of marriage as a partnership composed of one person of each sex, the state may
become more receptive to units of three or more ... and to units composed of two people
of the same sex but who are bound by friendship alone. All desirable changes in family law
need not be made at once." 48
The more broadly you define marriage, the less stringent the demands you can make
of people in it. Weston writes that "most chosen families are characterized by fluid
Sullivan, supra note 33, at 87.
Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in Andrew Sullivan, ed, Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and
Con 118 (Vintage Books, 1997).
47 I identify and analyze this development in Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1803 (1985).
48 David Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences ofMarriage and the Legal Needs ofLesbian and Gay Male Couples,
95 MICH. L. REV. 447,491 (1996).
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boundaries, eclectic composition, and relatively little symbolic differentiation between
erotic and nonerotic ties." 49 But where boundaries are fluid, where one family barely
resembles another, where erotic and platonic ties are hardly distinguishable, marriage is
no longer special. Yet making marriage special is part of making it work as a social institution.
I have been suggesting that the PRINCIPLES are animated by the antinomian and antiinstitutional ethos of elite legal academia. But the PRINCIPLES reflect one more change
in elite attitudes about family law that cuts in just the opposite direction. Several decades
ago, much family law scholarship exalted the principle of family autonomy. That principle
called for a law that intruded on people's lives in families as little as possible. Hope was
cherished that allowing spouses to arrange the terms of their marriage contractually would
create a world in which legal norms matched private wants. Fear was nurtured that the
state would always abuse its authority in enforcing the law of child abuse and neglect. The
state was the enemy, freedom the victim.
Today, the elite view of family law looks quite different. The family autonomy principle
has been battered by the argument that the enemy is not the state but a culture that gives
family members power over each other. In particular, the central problem became the
power that husbands had over wives. Family autonomy became not a bulwark against the
state but a grant of authority to husbands to abuse their wives physically, socially, and
economically. It became conventional academic wisdom that domestic violence should be
policed more actively, prosecuted more adamantly, and defined more broadly.
The PRINCIPLES strikingly reflect this dirigiste ethos. Contract is no longer the touchstone. The PRINCIPLES' provisions for the distribution of marital wealth seem to reflect a
confidence that the drafters have analyzed the moral relations of the parties more decently
than the parties themselves (even while many of those principles are somewhat eccentric 50 ).
The PRINCIPLES righteously impose the duties of spouses on cohabitants who had rejected
the opportunity to assume those duties. Perhaps worst of all, the PRINCIPLES harshly fail
in one of the first duties of law: to give citizens notice of the law's rules so that they can
plan their lives. Can it be that a document clothed in the language of liberty represents
the kind of expansion of governmental authority all too familiar in the history of elite law
reform?
49 KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 206 (Columbia U Press, 1991).
50 I criticize an earlier version of them in Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L.
REv. 197.

